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ABSTRACT
This paper discusses the future of strategic management research. It begins with a short
review of the present status of strategic management as a social science, and finds that little
progress has l:)een made. But, this lack of progress is typical of social sciences. Logical
positivism^ *lwcjii serves as the epistemological justification for most research in strategy.
The paper explains why logical positivism failed. In the second part of the paper, I offer
alternatives to logical positivism: critical theory, interpretation, and post-structuralism.
The overall theme of the paper is that changing ideas of language and representation have made
the traditional stance to strategic management research obsolete.
I. INTRODUCTION
Strategy scholars engage in many internecine debates. For example, they debate the merits
of the case method versus quantitative methods, about objective versus perceived environments,
about the presumptive benefits of diversification, and so on. But, these passionate arguments
mask broad agreements. At a deeper, more fundamental level, scholars fervently subscribe to
the idea that empirical research offers the best (I am tempted to write 'only') method to
secure valid knowledge about general management and strategy. Although the practical barriers
are formidable (for example, seldom having recourse to "crucial" experiments), they believe
scholarship is advancing — IN PRINCIPLE — towards valid knowledge, anchored firmly upon
objective, scientific underpinnings. In short, strategic management aspires to the rigid
standards of a prototype science. Unfortunately, the concrete accomplishments of strategic
management fail to satisfy those lofty aspirations. Briefly reviewing the status of strategic
management as a body of scientific work is one objective of this paper.
Owing to its broad charter, research on general management and strategy demands an
interdisciplinary focus. Consequently, strategic management occupies a derivative position.
Strategic management relies heavily on knowledge borrowed from other social sciences across
its permeable boundaries. In this position, strategic management naturally lags behind
important trends and developments originating elsewhere in social science. Therefore, the shape
of current conditions in the broad social science realm may offer a forecast to strategic
management about what to expect in its own future. But, today the senior social sciences have
fallen into schism and disarray. A kaleidoscopic range of schools and traditions have i
struggled mightily, but none of them have survived long enough to establish a stable, enduring,
body of theory — much less a paradigm. The confident optimism of the nineteen-sixties has
given way to a spectrum of opinion ranging from nagging doubts, to disillusion, to cynicism.
Examining the reasons for these disturbing developments sets a second objective.
Research methods in the social sciences derive chiefly from the theory of logical
positivism as expounded by the Vienna School in the 1920s. Alas, logical positivism has

collapsed, withdrawing the epistemological justification for everyday research in social
sciences. Explaining the downfall of logical positivism forms a third objective of this paper.
Until now, mounting challenges to empiricist traditions in social science have exerted
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only a negligible effect on the organizational disciplines. But even within the purview of the
management disciplines a process of self-appraisal has begun to worm its way into the insecure
foundations of organization behavior (for example, Burrell & Morgan, 1979; Steffy & Grimes,
1986; Smircich & Galas, 1986) and strategic management (Smircich & Stubbart, 1985;
Shrivastava, 1986), Although many theorists and researchers in strategic management recognize
their disciplinary impasse, few look beyond "qualitative versus quantitative" perspectives.
Examining the development of ideas about language and representation in the social sciences as
expressed by new research practices marks a fourth objective.
II. STRATEGIG MANAGEMENT AS A SOGIAL SGIENCE
In strategic management, scholarly training, standards for scholarly achievement,
professional status, and outlook, each reflect a sacrosanct commitment to probing the
empirical world, Gonceptual writing is taken seriously only if it has empirical referents and
consequences. For example, scholars pay attention to Porter (1980) because he set out a
framework amenable to empirical testing (e,g,, Dess & Davis, 1984), Moreover, strategy
scholars are striving harder after "rigor" (Camerer, 1985),
1. A LANDMARK TEXT ,
'*rhe Value of New P&radigms" is the first title, on page one, of Schendel & Hofer's (1979)
landmark strategic management book. They lament the absence of a paradigm in policy research,
and anxiously proclaim that strategic management is on the verge of attaining legitimate
paradigmatic status:
'*roday, the policy field is in need of a new paradigm than can end the continual and pointless
redefinition of concepts used in both practice and teaching. We believe that such a paradigm
is at hand, and this book is devoted to developing a a better and wider understanding of it
. . . "Strategic Management" (p. 2).
In spite of Schendel & Hofer's proclamation, other scholars (within strategy, in related
fields, and in distant fields) have repeatedly chided strategic management about its many
scientific shortcomings.
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._
CRITICISM FRCM_\VrrHIN_ THE STRATEGIC >IANAGH;e^_ RES^^^^
The chief complaints about strategic management fall within several broad categories:
i. Imprecision. Leontiades (1982) represents only the most recent in a long list of
reviews which decry the constantly expanding confusion about what "strategy" really is. Other
pivotal conceptual terms are just as slippery. Shrivastava & Peridis (1985) showed how
divergent this terminological morass is becoming. A science which cannot get its fundamental
concepts straight is going nowhere.
ii. Poor Theory. Adequate theoretical frameworks are seldom proposed, and those proposed
seldom appear in correct form. Many writings present elaborate, excessively-abstract concepts
which hint at theory but fail to meet the minimal requirements of a theoretical statement (for
example, Chakravarthy, 1983; Porter, 1980; Lawrence & Dyer, 1983; Kotter, 1982; Quinn, 1980;
Miles & Cameron, 1982). The inadequacies of these "theories" lead to divergent interpretations,
differing operationalizations, and inconclusive tests. Without satisfactory theoretical
statements, empirical work is pointless.
iii. Fragmentation. An unruly amalgam of topics, perspectives, isolated empirical
generalizations, and quasi-theories, vie for scholars* attention. Shirley (1983) worried about
this lack of focus in strategy research. Freeman & Lorange (1985) found so many proliferating
theories that they had to build a raeta-framework intelligible to Martians. Conceptual
beachheads have been recently established by behavioral decision theory (Schwenk, 198A),
biology (Aldrich, 1979), industrial economics (Porter, 1980), critical theory (Shrivastava,
1986), and phenomenology (Smircich & Stubbart, 1985). One school of thought in strategy
replaces (displaces) another without any cumulative progress.
iv. Empiricallmpasse. One by one, topics sink into inconclusive deadlocks. For
instance, Lenz & Engledow (1984) described how environmental analysis has become gridlocked
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between competing perspectives, A long series of studies trying to isolate the presumed
effects of strategic planning on organizational performance have reached a dense impasse
(Hogarth & Makridakis, 1981; Armstrong, 1982; Schrader et, al«, 198A). Inconclusive but
methodologically adroit debates about market share, diversification, and performance are
becoming a source of permanent employment for researchers (Wensley, 1982; Reed S Luffman,
1986). Studies cannot soon resolve the acrimonious argument over the relative merits of
dialectical inquiry versus devil's advocate (Cosier et. al., 1978; Mitroff & Erashoff, 1979;
Chanin & Shapiro, 1985; and Schweiger et. al., 1986).
V, Fads. "Legitimate science" is not vulnerable to fads. Its resistance to fads rests
in the insulation dictated by standards of verification, replication, and testing against
competing theories. Unfortunately, strategic management is often swept by fads such as the
past fascination with "portfolio models" and the current premature acceptance of "competitive
strategy." A rapid turnover in theories and concepts, plus an unhealthy vulnerability to
fashions and ephemeral topics, suggests that scientific weakness plagues the field.
Summing up an important segment of opinion about the status of the discipline, Camerer
(1985) argued that strategic management scholarship should smarten up and follow the examples
of marketing where, "mysterious arts . . . have been replaced by an amalgam of sciences,
including statistics and consumer psychology," and accounting, which has "been annexed by
financial economics, agency theory, and behavioural decision theory" (p. 15).
These internal debates generally encompass a fairly broad range of technical concerns,
but lag behind important developments elsewhere in organizational sciences,
3, THE OGANIZATIQN THEORY WORLD BEYOND THE \^MLS OF THE STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT FIELD..
Many scholarly discontents surfaced at a heavily-attended symposium discussion during the
August 1986 Academy of Management National Meeting entitled: "Evaluating the Last Five Years of
Strategic Management Research," Professor Daft — inspecting strategic management from the
neighboring discipline of organization theory delivered remarks entitled, '*rhe Past and Future
of Strategic Management Research: On a Fast track to Nowhere?" His concerns were different
4
from the internal critique — the critique of "lack of rigor," Instead, he pointed out the
strategy field's problems in three broad areas: premature commitments to a narrow set of
logical positivist social science assumptions, premature commitments to multivariate
methodologies, and a premature commitment to a narrow definition of organizational
effectiveness. His remarks suggested that the field ought to slow down, to reassess it
commitments and its direction. Is it time to re-appraise these "premature" commitments? A
wider perspective on developments in the social sciences suggests that a moment for re-
appraisal and self-examination has indeed arrived,
4. IHE WORLD BEYOND THE WALLS OF ORGANIZATIONAL DISCIPLINES
Although some scholars might think that strategic management merely suffers from the
normal confusion of disciplinary childhood, histories of other social disciplines disclose no
examples of social sciences which have advanced much beyond a stage of confusion and cliaos,
except for short periods.
Popper (1963) argued that refutations of particular theories was not a failure for a
science. Many theories would be offered, but only a few good ones could withstand serious
testing. But, in the social sciences, no such accumulation of grounded theories — much less
paradigms —has taken place:
"
, , , there is an extensive and growing body of literature that reveals the empirical,
methodological, logical, and ideological inadequacies of empirical theories, including
'functionalist theories', 'equilibrium theories', 'systems theories', and 'social
exchange' theories. While there are vehement disputes about how fruitful these theories really
are, and in what sense, if any, they approximate the ideal of an empirical theory, no
responsible scientist has asserted that we have yet achieved anything comparable to what was
achieved in sixteenth and seventeenth century science." (Bernstein, 1976, p. 27).
The development of disciplines such as psychology, sociology, political science, and
anthropology, follows a chaotic, seemingly random succession of competing frameworks,
perspectives, and approaches. Contemporary perspectives do not borrow from, or build upon,
their predecessors — they annihilate earlier perspectives. Only embarrassing theoretical
wreckage, conceptual ghost towns, and the tombstones of discarded hypotheses dot the landscape
of social science — leaving no residual accumulation of grounded theory.
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One notes many signs of growing frustration and discontent. Social scientific literatures
report increasing dislocation, disorder, and demoralization. For example, a noted scholar
writes that economics reveals nothing about the empirical world:
'*ro my mind, mainstream American economists reflect more an academic need for an internal
theoretical consistency and rigor than it reflects observable, measurable realities in the
world we all live in, , , I am convinced that accepting the supply-demand model of the economy
is rather like believing that the v/orld is flat, or that the sun revolves around the earth . .
hypotheses used to understand the behavior of the economy found in the real world" (Thurow,
1983, p.xvii, xix).
Recognizing their habitual failure to construct grounded theories and lasting paradigms,
many scholars now find social science guilty of intellectual check-kiting:
",
, , ideas worked out in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries . . , must be radically
overhauled today, , , state of disarray that characterizes social theory today — a matter of
common awareness to anyone working in the social sciences. The past decade or so has seen the
revival of traditionally established forms of theory (such as hermeneutics), the emergence of
seemingly novel perspectives (especially ethnomethodology), and the attempted incorporation
within social theory of various approaches claimed to be drawn from formerly separate
philosophical endeavours (the philosophy of the later Wittgenstein, ordinary language
philosophy, and phenomenology), (Giddens, 1979, p,235).
Some scholars recommend discarding the logical positivist program altogether:
"As long as there has been a social science, the expectation has been that it would turn from
its humanistic infancy to the maturity of hard science, thereby leaving behind its dependence
on value, judgment, and individual insight. The dream of modern Western man to be freed from
his passions, his unconscious, his history, and his traditions through the liberating use of
reason has been the deepest theme of contemporary social thought. Perhaps the deepest theme of
the twentieth century, however, has been the shattering of the triumphalist view of history. ,
predecessors, as the heralds of the new age of an at last established science. They remain,
like their predecessors, disappointed , , , , Now the time seems ripe, even overdue, to
announce that there is not going to be an age of paradigm in the social sciences" (Rabinov^ fi
Sullivan, 1979 p, 1-A),
Scholars have thrown plenty of XXXX at the wall, but none has stuck for long. The lack of
scientific progression and the absence of universal grounded theory frustrates even the most
patient social scientists. The familiar argument that the youthfulness or immaturity of the
social sciences justifies the absence of scientific progress and is beginning to sound hollow.
Of course, the mere fact that no paradigms have surfaced in the social sciences does not
foreclose the possibility that paradigms might yet arrive. The social sciences* Copernicus,
Kepler, and Newton may have recently passed their PhD qualifying exams. But, a hard-headed
prima facie case holds that the social science research strategy has simply not worked.
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5. \vHAT rOT FOR STRATEGIC MANAGEIENT?_
Many scholars vigorously espouse t±ie ideals of empirical scientific work first advocated
by the logical positivists and developed into a methodology by Merton and others. They believe
that scientific work without a paradigm will not do. They want to become "harder", "more
rigorous," and get a hold on secure knowledge.
The writing of Caraerer (1985) bears witness to the continuing attraction of the logical
positivist program, Camerer bemoaned the fact that strategic management had obviously failed to
satisfy the criteria for scientific legitimacy and success. He confidently argued that
strategic management must emulate "harder" sciences like economics, which
follow the logical positivist rules more rigorously. Strategic management scholars simply must
stop doing bad research. To him, the logical positivist ideal is "idee fixe,"
Should scholars rally to Camerer's call? Will an intensified logical positivism generate
the kind of grounded, paradigmatic knowledge that Camerer finds so alluring? It is ironic that
today, when Camerer and others vociferously advocate a re-dedication to pure logical
positivism, logical positivism has been lying dead for decades (See Suppe, 1977). Knowing why
logical positivism died is an integral part of understanding just what kind of social sciences
are possible in the future.
Ill, EMPIRICIST EPISTE^DLOGY
Although the development of physical and social sciences has largely displaced and
suppressed traditional philosophical concerns about ontology and cosmology, discussions about
epistemology have intensified. The particular issue which merits our attention is the
perennial search for a general theory of representation, an immutable, eternal foundation for
knowledge, an ahistorical, theory-independent ground. To properly understand the pivotal
importance of representation in empirical social sciences, and the acute distress currently
enveloping the question of representation, one needs to review the genealogy of social
research, I want to outline some intellectual history which helps to answer the question, "How
did we get the organization theory/ strategic management science we practice?"
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1. THE AGE OF THE LOGICAL POSITIVISTS (or Logical Empiricists )_
i. Origins, Before Locke, no serious scholars thought that sensory data had anything to
do with knowledge of Man, Empiricism only became possible when the Renaissance, and then the
Enlightenment undermined the Church's monolithic authority over society. Additional changes
in the 18th and 19th centuries such as dazzling advances in physical sciences and technology,
the painful breakdown of traditional agrarian society in the wake of the Industrial Revolution,
and the liberating ideas of the French Revolution, set the stage for drastic realignments of
thought about science,
ii. Formation of the Vienna Circle, By the 1920s the thematic elements of logical
positivism crystallized with the formation of the "Vienna Circle" of philosophy (Feigl,
Neurath, Schlick, Carnap, Ayer, Hempel). These scholars sought to erect standards for a
paradigmatic science. Three key assertions defined their program:
a. Verification, Knowledge only comes from science, nowhere else. Science yields
knowledge because scientific assertions are warranted by empirical experiment and observations.
If there is no way to empirically verify a statement, that statement has no meaning and falls
outside the (worthwhile) realm of science. For example, questions such as 'Vhat is ethical?"
can never be answered by science. The correct scientific basis for knowledge was the
"observational sentence," Observational sentences were to be based on incorrigible sense-data
experiences, such as "I see red" (with finger pointed toward red apple) wherein a scientific
observer made straightforward, non-inferential judgments, Schlick (1959) wrote:
"In order to find the meaning of a proposition, we must transform it by successive
definitions until finally only such words occur in it as can no longer be defined, but whose (
meanings can caily be directly pointed out" (p, 106).
Veriflability called a halt to pointless scientific discussions about vacuous, ethereal topics,
"Give us hard data " was the battle cry of logical positivism,
b. Logical Construction, VJhitehead and Russell (1911) achieved a stunning advance
when they managed to reduce mathematics to logic and set theory. Logical constructions could
provide the bridge between sense data and theory. Their theory of logic provided crystal clear
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methods to represent sentences and logically important structures within sentences. Using
rigorous characterizations, sentences could be proven from other sentences. The logical
positivists realized that if theoretical sentences could be tied to true observational
' sentences by logic, a grand system for linking theory to incontrovertible data was at hand.
Therefore, complex theories must be reduced to their simplest elements, so simple that our
experience of them is self-evidently true. Logical construction banished insecure
interpretations by anchoring scientific knowledge with indisputable sense data. Positivists
thought they had finally found an airtight method to substitute real knowledge for mush dished
out in fancy language.
c. Unity of Science, The logical positivists argued that because science studies
verifiable empirical phenomena, that only one science was necessary. They elected physics as
the best approximation of a true science. They expected all the evidence of chemistry,
biology, psychology, and sociology to "reduce" to physical evidence. Such was the
reductionist part of their program. In the social sciences this principle stimulated the
methodological practice of "operationalism,"
2, THE IMPACT OF LOGICAL POSITIVISM.
Logical positivism united several important dimensions of a new intellectual landscape.
First, it expressed a renewed commitment to the empiricism espoused by Bacon, Hume, Berkeley
and Locke — at the expense of scholasticism and against the rationalism of Descartes,
Empiricists insisted that worldly knowledge is only gained by experience of worldly phenomena.
Christian theology and German Idealism were passionately rejected as the basis for knowledge,
as was the authority of the Greek classics. Second, logical positivism made a bold commitment
to science. Spectacular advances in physical sciences and mathematics cleared the way for a
self-confident, materialist and pragmatic belief in the power of empirical science. Third,
logical positivism was committed to the power of logic
Logical Positivism's grand scheme thrilled the scientific and philosophical communities.
With a clean, bold stroke they banished transcendental, other-worldly, ineffable, and shadowy
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supernatural junk fron the halls of science. It was a beautiful, heroic theory that just had to
be true. And it provided a foundation for research. Their no-nonsense program launched a
generation of scholars in search of certainty, structure and rigor (eg., behaviorism,
structural linguistics).
Before 1945, few scholars working in social sciences had any training in empirical
research methods. Robert Merton was a leader in changing this. In Social Theory and Social
Structure (Merton, 1949) he outlined a sophisticated approach to empirical theory v/hich still
largely represents the views of most social scientists.
Merton drew heavily on themes from logical positivism, thinking social sciences should aim
for the same type of theories and knowledge which characterize the physical sciences. But, he
was cautious, expecting that generating scientific social knowledge would require much careful,
patient work and many failures.
According to Merton, theory is not equivalent to collections of variables, approaches,
conceptual analysis, or perspectives. He would disapprove of the casual way some scholars apply
the term 'theory' in the organizational sciences today. Instead, a theory consists of clear,
verifiable statements of relationships among variables — logically interrelated propositions
having empirical consequences. From these propositions scientists devise the hypotheses
necessary for explanation, prediction, and testing. Exactly the logical positivist program.
Merton proposed the task of constructing "theories of the middle range", aiming at an
intermediate range of complex explanations — between grand theories of society (such as
Parsons, 1951) and minor theories relating two obscure variables.
To sum up Merton*s view, gaining access to the laws of social reality — theoretical
knowledge — is the purpose of the social scientific enterprise. Social scientists should
follow the example of physical sciences in ontological, epistemological, and methodological
realms. Therefore, competent social scientists had to learn about theory construction, the
design of experiments, observation, and statistical analysis. Moreover, generating and testing
theory presented the cornerstone task. And searching for theories of the middle-range offered
the best prospects for success. 10
Merton's fundamentals ushered in the hypothetical-deductive explanation: "brute data,"
objectivity, validity, reliability, context-free operations, generalizability, law-like
statements, quantification techniques and scientific detachment — establishing the appropriate
methods for empirical research on society. Merton*s ideas about empirical science echo
throughout organizational literature (Bourgeois, 1979, Kerlinger, 1973; Miner, 1982; Kaplan,
1964). Today, 40 years later, Merton's logical positivist vievrs are humdrum, they v/ouldn't
cause any raised eyebrows among the Academy of Management,
3. ALLURING AND ELUSIVE PARADIGMS
Although Kuhn (1962, 1970) originally had little to say about social science, social
scientists were interested in what Kuhn had to say. Many social scientists were attracted to
Kuhn's writing by his idea of disciplinary "paradigms." Kuhn defined paradigms as "universally
recognized scientific achievements that for a time provide model problems and solutions to a
community of practitioners" (1970, p. viii). According to Kuhn, paradigms encompass, "law,
theory, application, and instrumentation together" (1970, p. 10). As such, paradigms
represent an extension, codification, and institutionalization of Merton's mid-range theories.
Working without a "normal" paradigm connotes chaos, confusion, and frustration. Mon-
paradigmatic activities accumulate with agonizing irregularity, generate little systematic
knowledge, and represent social and professional inefficiencies. Many of Kuhn's readers
concluded that locating and mining a viable paradigmatic vein signaled true scientific
achievement. Because of their beliefs about the perils of non-paradigmatic activities,
scientists search frantically for a paradigmatic umbrella if they don't already have one.
4_,^__SyMMARY_,
The tenets of logical positivism establish a scientific agenda for social research as
extended by Merton and others. By following such methods, social scientists expected to
produce solid mid-range theory, propelling their disciplines to paradigmatic status.
Social scientists accepted the tenets of logical positivism, steadfastly followed the
methods derived from it, and fervently hoped for the arrival of paradigms which would put them
on a legitimate scientific footing. We are entitled, indeed obligated, to measure what has
been accomplished by these methods in strategic management and in social sciences generally.
II.
IV. HOIv^ LOGICAL POSITIVISil VJEITI WRO:IG
Why didn't the logical positive program work? The chief problem turned out to be logical
positivism's reliance on the "picture theory" of language.
1. PROBLB-IS HIDDBI IN THE PICTUPvE THEORY OF LANGUAGE.
In defining their program, the logical positivists relied heavily on V/ittgenstein's
"picture theory" of language (Wittgenstein, 1921). The picture theory argued that language
mirrors external reality (See figure one). Hence, the structure of reality could be studied
\\^ithin the confines of normal language. Logical positivists assumed that language served non-
problematic representational functions. V/ords simply reflect something real somewhere outside
the language itself:
"Realist literature tends to conceal the socially relative or constructed nature of language:
it helps to confirm the prejudice that there is a form of 'ordinary language' which is somehow
natural. This language gives us reality 'as it is* . . . as God himself might know it. The
sign is not seen as a changeable entity determined by the rules of a particular changeable
sign-system: it is seen as a translucent window on to the object, or on to the mind. It is
quite neutral and colourless in itself: its only job is to represent something else, become the
vehicle of meaning conceived quite independently of itself, and it must interfere v;ith what it
mediates as little as possible . . . words link up with their thoughts or objects in
essentially right and uncontrovertible ways: the word becomes the only proper way of viewing
this object or expressing this thought" (Eagleton, 1983, pp. 135-136).
i. This key element of their program proved untenable. In an astonishing intellectual
turnaround, Wittgenstein (1953) rejected his own "picture theory" of language. Instead, he
described human interaction as language "games," where words play a variety of subtle,
ambiguous and indeterminate roles incompatible with logical positivism. He demonstrated that
neither the notion of an ideal scientific language nor the idea that language is an isomorphic
representation of reality could hold up under close analysis,
ii, Austin (1962) demonstrated that sentences have no literal, face value meaning.
Sentences only take on meaning in a wider context. Sentences were seen to have a performative
dimension as well as a literal dimension. Meaning depends on who, when, where, why, and so fortl
iii, Sellars (1968) demonstrated that language acquisition precedes sense data reporting
abilities. Therefore, an existing language community always governs the knowledge game (see
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Astley, 1985, for relevance to organizational issues).
iv. Quine (1953) pointed out the inconclusive nature of experiments. He showed that
experiments can never soundly refute theories, because scientific hypotheses form interlocking,
interdependent networks of statements which cannot be tested sentence by sentence. By
modifying implicit background assumptions, any theory can always be protected. Even more
disturbing, because competing theories rely on incommensurable data, no convincing formal
criterion for making a rational choice between competing theories has been offered,
V, Analyses revealed that even the most-direct sensory data cannot be trusted completely.
At one time, "sensible" people observed that the Sun moved about the Earth, and laughed at the
preposterous idea that the Earth might be a sphere. Additionally, studies show that context,
intentions, training and past experiences affect reports about visual perception, hearing, and
touch (Qiurchland & Churchland, 1981). Contradictory experiences of sense perceptions make the
idea of infallible sense data hard to defend. The proposition that direct sense data occupy a
"privileged" epistemological position has proven untenable.
vi. According to logical positivism, it was necessary to have a "chain" of theories
linking different kinds and levels of theory to the procrustean, incorrigible sense data. For
example, psychology should reduce to neurobiology. But studies (Kuhn, 1962 S 1970; Feyerabend,
1975; Hooker, 1981) have shown that theoretical change in the sciences almost never fits the
positivist account of logical reduction. For instance, Einsteinian field theory will not
reduce to Newtonian mechanics. Instead, scientific change moves haphazardly: annihilating old
theories, revamping observations and displacing old data.
All these problems in logical positivism were tied to language issues. A growing
preoccupation with language, thought, knowledge, and theory has defined the epistemological
discussion since logical positivism,
2. A CRISIS IN REPRESENTATION..
Today, logical positivism is defunct but not departed. According to the Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (1972), "Logical Positivism is dead, or as dead as a philosophical movement ever
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becomes." Asked about these developments, A.J. Aver (a prime mover in logical positivism)
remarked in 1978, "I suppose that the most important defect v/as that nearly all of it was
false." Hesse (1972) summarized some of the major changes in scientific thinking v/hich
demarcate the demise of the positivist era:
©. Data are not detachable from theory, for what counts as data are determined in light of
some theoretical interpretation.
0. Theories are not models externally compared to nature in a hypothetical-deductive
schema, they are the v/ay the facts themselves are seen.
0. The lawlike relations asserted of experience are internal, because what count as facts
are constituted by what the theory says about tlieir inter-relations v;ith one another.
©, The language of natural science is irreducibly metaphorical and inexact, and
formalizable only at the cost of distorting the historical dynamics of science.
©. Meanings in natural science are determined by theory; they are understood by
theoretical coherence rather than by correspondence with facts.
She also pointed out that post-empiricist accounts of the physical sciences no longer
follow the standard dichotomy v/hich is often described in social science debates:
'Vhat is immediately striking about it to readers versed in recent literature is philosophy of
science is that almost every point made about the human sciences has recently been made about
the natural sciences, and that the points made about natural sciences presuppose a traditional
empiricist viev/ of natural science that is almost universally discredited" (Hesse, 1980),
With the collapse of logical positivism the epistemological scaffolding supporting the
whole edifice of the empirical sciences was withdrawn (Suppe, 1977). An intellectual Pandora's
box was pried open. The era of grand theories and hegemonic discourses (such as Freud, Marxism,
Parsons') has expired. It is not just the content of the theories that is questioned, not a
question of quantitative versus qualitative, rather it is the whole paradigmatic style which is
under pressure from linguistic concerns. The key feature of this moment is a rejection of
metanarratives, paradigms, and grand unified theories — a loosening generally called Post-
modernism. Scholarly work retreats toward local, fragmented, momentary, fragile types of
description. During the last twenty years sociology, philosophy, linguistics, literary theory,
historiography, economics, law, architecture and other disciplines have all experienced a
growing anxiety and frustration over the the representational issues betv/een language, thought
and knowledge — How shall we describe reality? How do words hook onto reality?
Social sciences appear to be on the threshold of an intellectual free-for-all, where
scholarship is awkwardly stranded between the rear-guard actions of the remnants of a
discredited logical positivism and the intolerable skepticism, detachment, and meagre promises
* of postmodernism. The outlook suggests a period of suspended beliefs; a tolerance for eclectic
approaches and conceptual risk-taking; an attention toward local, fragmentary knov;ledge rather
than totalizing, global knowledge; preference for explanations of exceptions rather than
regularities; an ironic, critical, disbelieving attitude toward one's v;ork; v/hile scholars
struggle to find a tolerable mode of representation.
Though the strategic management landscape is littered with the corpses of discarded
theories, few scholars advocate overhauling the system which produced those inadequate
theories. Although one finds few philosophers who will say they are logical positivists, one
finds many researchers in strategy, organization theory, and organization behavior who v^rork as
if they still subscribe to logical positivist principles. The situation reminds me of
"escalating commitment" (Staw & Ross, 1978), or Pfeffer's (1981) "law of unrequited effort."
Although strategic management is currently isolated from these debates and developments beliind
a conceptual and psychological 'cordon sanitaire*, its deep commitments to logicsil positivist
empiricism combined with its inherent need to reach across disciplinary boundaries, will
eventually attract the same critiques which rack its older, larger, more fully developed
disciplinary kin — with the same fatal result.
3. FROM LOGICAL POSinVIgl TO POST-iMODERNISTI
Following sections sketch out substitutes for a logical positivist science of society.
For each alternative I briefly examine its origin, its theory of knov\rledge and notions of
scholarship as potentially applicable to strategic management, and describe its
representational departures and limitations. (Of course, in practice these positions are
subject to many variations and nuances.) In general, these alternatives trace out a
representational field shifting farther and farther away from logical positivist assumptions
about language,
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V. CRITICAL THEORY: HABERMAS AND THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL
l,__ORIGIi''JS. A group of philosophers loosely known as the "Frankfurt School", including
Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse, Wellmer, and Habermas, argued that essential ideas contained in
the works of Marx and Freud foreshadov/ed a new type of theory — critical theory. Critical
theorists have contributed critiques of capitalism, bureaucracy, rationality, technology, law,
the family, art, music, and literature.
See Geuss (1981) or McCarthy (1978) for a more detailed discussion.
2. KNOV/LEDGE. Habermas (1971) claimed that knowledge organizes around three "cognitive
interests": technical (about work), practical (about human interaction), and emancipatory
(about power). Emancipatory knowledge constitutes the rightful province of critical theory.
In organizational settings, governing groups might suppress legitimate criticism and distort
communication by translating social questions into technical questions. According to critical
theory, governing groups institute false ideologies and false consciousness to prevent members
from understanding their true situation. People can only emancipate themselves from social
repression by freeing themselves from their ideological illusions. Rational critique is the
chief method of critical theory for pursuing that emancipatory knov/ledge. To aid in this
revelatory struggle, scholars staunchly contend that critical science must extinguish ideology.
The interaction of ideology with knowledge at two levels sets a framework for
emancipation. The first level is the critique of social theory and method; and the second
level is the critique of the relationship between scholars and practitioners. At the first
level, critical theory is particularly critical of positivist science, as illustrated in the
famous debates between Adorno and Popper, Critical theorists charge logical positivism with
encroaching on the human sciences, of launching a type of scholarly imperialism:
"For the philosophy of science that has emerged since the mid-nineteenth century as the heir
to the theory of knowledge is methodology pursued with a scientistic self-understanding of the
sciences, 'Scientism' means science's belief in itself: that is, the conviction that v;e can no
longer understand science as one form of knowledge, but rather must identify knowledge with
science." (Habermas, 1971, p. 4).
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Habermas and other critical theorists claim that ideological interests pollute certain
sciences. Is strategic management ideological? Several conditions indicate hazardous
ideological ingredients in strategic management science:
i. Social scientists make many prescriptions about society. When allegedly scientific
recommendations are not based on grounded knowledge, ideology is using science for camoflage.
An apriori prescriptive element strongly guided strategic management from the fields'
inception. The disciplinary history of strategic management clearly shows that prescriptions
have alv/ays outstripped factual determinations. Scholars rushed pell mell to promote the idea
of strategic planning long before empirical research on the topic even began (Ansoff, 1965).
ii. Self-interested groups might manipulate their communications to other groups, as in
Machiavelli. If groups treat their selfish interests as universally legitimate for diverse
communities and claim that science upholds their interests, then ideology masquerades as sc
Strategic management researchers and writers explicitly tie their work directly to the
interests of top management of companies. For instance, Andrews (1980), Schendel a. Hofer
(1979) and others make strategic management contingent upon general managers' autonomy,
inclinations, and interests. These commitments are acknowledged regularly in textbooks, in
scholarly meetings, and practitioner literature. Additionally, scholars argue against
producing knowledge "not actionable" or irrelevant to general managers' agendas.
By adopting the perspective of companies' managers, scholars implicitly overrule the
interests of social units both larger and smaller than a "company." By lionizing general
managers, by making sectional interests into determinants of knowledge, scholars inadvertently
raise strategists' goals to universally valid goals.
iii. Dominant groups in society naturally prefer to deny and obscure contradictions. If
a community refuses to confront the conflicts and contradictions inherent in their social
systems and knowledge systems, then ideological interests are suppressing genuine
communication. A general manager framework invites scholars to ask obvious questions, but the
framework puts critical questions about general managers' motives and behavior out of bounds,
by defining-out any knov/ledge which — although true —is not useful to general managers, or
harms their sacred interests. These commitments relegate strategic management scholarship to a
subservient, technical role — handmaidens of the general manager. Consequently, strategic
management remains isolated from many contentious issues, such as the nature of capitalism,
evils of monopoly power, bureaucracy, class struggle, and so forth.
iv. Powerful groups jealously guard their ascendency. If social theories claim that the
status quo represents a natural condition, and if they imply that changes are unnatural or
undesirable, such claims constitute evidence of ruling ideological interests.
There has been no debate in the strategic management literature about the legitimacy and
role of top management. If anything, the pov/er and rights of the CEO have been expanded by
strategic management.
It is easy to build a case that strategic management has been adversely affected by
ideological constraints. Critical theory advocates an approach v/hich:
® effectively critiques its own epistraological and methodological foundations.
i enlarges its research agenda to include critique of the intent of particular research.
® viev;s research as a social practice.
6 aims for effective, ethical, institutional change.
To purge ideological elements, a critical analysis of strategic management begins by
constructing a taxonomy of strategy's ontology, epistemology, methods, and its practical
consequences. Next, scholars must critique the intersections of theory, methods, practice,
intentions, and ideology in strategic management. Important issues include:
• VJhat interests does strategy management serve/oppress?
• V/hat ideological elements contaminate strategy research?
• How do bureaucratic and ideological systems legitimate this knowledge?
8 What ideological interests control the production and distribution of strategic knowledge?
• What role does strategy discourse play in societal institutions?
f What is the purpose, form, and consequence of interaction with practitioners?
Accordingly, a critical strategic management discipline must constantly engage in self-
reflection and self-questioning.
3. METI{OD. Critical theory presents itself as an empirical and practical project as well
as a theoretical one. An organi2:ation facing strategic issues can serve as a site for
critical analysis. Steffy & Grimes (1986) discussed some of the methodological components of
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applying critical theory at such a site:
i. An analysis of the local language, history, and communicative actions which support
institutional activity. This analysis includes empirical and quantitative studies of objective
social structures, such as strategy, environment, and organizational structure.
ii. Next, the investigator must interpret the facts which were turned up. Scholars
probe participants' viewpoints and the historical context of the so-called facts.
Interpretation may reveal alienation, institutional oppression, distorted communication, and
ideological contamination.
iii. Lastly, practicing critical theory demands social activism and ethical commitments
from scholars. It propounds an overtly political philosophy, aiming to uncover the objective
facts about capitalist society and liberate people through a revolution of consciousness. An
analysis must include the investigators' analysis of their own values, their intentions, and
constraints on their work. A critical study should help practitioners rationally reconstruct
their social systems to liberate practitioners* human potential: combatting ideology,
overcoming alienation, and restoring an ideal speech community. Validation of knowledge and
needed changes are determined by practitioner community-acceptance.
4. SUI'IMARY. Critical theory offers a useful perspective to strategic management research,
because it places major emphasis on critiquing the underlying assumptions, intentions, and
methods of strategic management, currently a weak area in strategy.
Critical theory is suspicious of everyday representations. Its principal lines of
analysis involve the Freudian idea of the unconscious (something hidden is directing the
conscious) and the Marxist ideas of society (something hidden is governing the apparent social
structure). It recognizes that language can cover up, deceive, or mis-represent the
objective situation. But this problem of mis-representation is a problem of the deceits of
society, not a problem of duplicity inherent in language itself. Objective phenomena are
simply being called by the wrong terms. Mis-representation can be straightened out by banishing
false consciousness and ideology. In this regard, critical tlieory views of representation are
not different from a positivist view. 19
However, there is one important distinction between critical theory and logical positivism
in validating Icnowledge. In critical theory, knov/ledge is valid when a rational community says
it is valid, not because of correspondence between representations and their proper objects
(although this may be implicit).
VI. INTERPRETEIG TEXTS, INTEPvPPvETING CULTURE.
This section outlines two types of interpretation, the interpretation of written texts —
generally called hermeneutics; and the interpretation of social action — cultural ethnography.
These two types of analysis share a general orientation toward representation and some common
origins.
1. THE DITEPRETATIOM OF TEXTS .
i. Origin, The term hermeneutics derives from Greek "to interpret." Traditional
hermeneutics consisted of the analysis of biblical texts and other religious documents. By the
late 19th and early 20th centuries, Schliermacher, Dilthey, and Heidegger had enlarged the
scope of hermeneutics to interpret other types of documents, Hermeneutical analysis plays an
important role in the writings of Gadamer, Habermas, Betti, Bernstein, Giddens, and Ricoeur.
ii, Knov/ledge, Modern hermeneutics differs from logical positivism regarding pivotal
epistemological issues:
®. First, hermeneutics does not seek or guarantee certainty. Instead, it recognizes
pragmatic, provisional knov/ledge.
0. Second, hermeneutical scholarship acknov/ledges that forms of human understanding never
entirely escape the self-understanding and biases of a human interpreter, a discipline, or a
historical epoch. Because of this reflexive element — in that social scientists study the
societies of which they are themselves products — writers refer to the "hermeneutical circle"
of understanding/self understanding.
§. Third, a written work always affords many interpretations of its meaning. I/hat the
text represents is not limited only to what its author intended, or strictly defined by the
words on the page — signs which point in many directions. Most hermeneutical analyses
downplay the ideal of representing objects as they "really are", Tliey seek no privileged
position, no archimedean point upon which to anchor objective representations. Instead,
hermeneutics settles for tentative interpretations from multiple perspectives. Rabinov;
succinctly summed up hermeneutics' epistemological position by remarking, "Ilerraeneutics is a
kind of knowledge without foundations: a knowledge that essentially amounts to edifying
conversation" (Rabinov/, 1986, p.236).
®. Lastly, hermeneutics takes reading more seriously than seeing. Hermeneutics* quest for
understanding follows a model of literary analysis and meaning instead of tlie model of
empirical observing which permeates logical positivism. Hermeneutics scholars are acutely
sensitive to the subtleties of language and its ambiguous, inexact relationship with empirical
experience. Therefore, hermeneutics is not anchored by the observational, empirical, sense
data which drive logical positivism, it eschev/s cause/effect logic, and does not aim for
predictive validity.
These four contrasts suggest that hermeneutics forms an art of human understanding, not a
science. As such, hermeneutics' thrust is toward the mental, spiritual, and wholistic.
'*rhe historical-hermeneutic sciences gain knowledge in a different methodological framework.
Here the meaning of validity of propositions is not constituted in the frame of reference of
technical control . . . For theories are not constructed deductively and experience is not
organized with regard to the success of operations. Access to the facts is provided by the
understanding of meaning, not observation. The verification of lawlike hypotheses in empirical
analytic sciences has its counterpeirt here in the interpretation of texts. Thus the rules of
hermeneutics determine the possible meaning of the validity of statements of the cultural
sciences" (Habermas, 1973, p. 309).
2. READING STRATEGY.
Any text can be viewed as an invitation to a reading. The longer and more complex the
written information, the greater the opportunity to read it in different, interesting xvrays.
Strategic management research is mainly v/ritten — journal articles, the business press,
scholarly books, courses, speeches, dissertations — a discourse on strategy. Although many
scholars "read" these texts for the facts and theories expounded there, few texts have been
"read" to decipher their meanings as psychological/social/cultural/political texts.
Hermeneutic analysis of strategic management texts such as Chandler (1962) or Ansoff (1965)
or whole bodies of ^^^ork (such as Mintzberg's many v/ritings) afford opportunities for reading.
Such readings follow an eclectic method:
"
. . .
there is no general hermeneutics, no universal canon for exegesis, but only disparate
and opposed theories concerning the rules of interpretation. The hermeneutic field ... is
internally at variance with itself" (Ricoeur, 1974, p.299).
Some readerly questions about the rhetorical and nsurrative aspects of strategy writing include:
§ V.'hat is the story, plot? V/liat genre(s) is strategy ivnriting?
V/hat is the relationship between the writer and the text, his/her presence or absence?
© What legitimates the writer's authority?
Q Who is the implied reader? His/her Icnowledge? Position? How is strategy writing
received by its readers?
i What is the context of the text? \*/hat were the historical and social circumstances of
its writing, and what other texts does it tie into?
© Which tactics or methods does the text use to justify the plausibility and authenticity
of its message? How does it embellish and use jargon?
Which (un)familiar themes, allusions, conventions, imagery, and codes does it use?
Authors have suggested many inventive approaches to the reader's task. Interesting approaches
to reading include, Iser (1978), Bco (1979), and Suleiman S Crosman, (1980).
For additional information on hermeneutics see Palmer (1969).
3. PLEADING THE CULTURE OF STRATEGIC MANAGS-IENT.
Several distinct interpretive perspectives partly find their origins in the idea of
Transcendental Phenomenology originating with the writings of Husserl (1931), Husserl v/anted a
science of the conscious, lived v/orld; knowledge systematically excluded by logical positivism,
Unlil<e logical positivism, phenomenology refused to search for ultimate realities strictly
within the confines of objective, sensory experience. Phenomenology probed for the essential
structures which shape the consciousness of everyday life.
Because of its focus on the solitary human subject to the exclusion of all social
relationships; its static, ahistorical stance; excessive rationalism, obscure presentations, and
its inattention to the problems of language/representation, Husserl's original phenomenology
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was modified by his successors. After Husserl, phenomenology branched out into existentialism,
interpretive sociology, ethnomethodology, and symbolic interactionism.
Some writers proposed that scholars could read and interpret social action as they read
and interpret texts (Ricoeur, 1981). Viewing social action as a text opens the field of
ethnographic analyses — reading culture. Geertz wrote of the link between hermeneutics and
ethnography:
"Doing ethnography is like trying to read ... a manuscript — foreign, faded, full of
ellipses, incoherencies, suspicious emendations, and tendentious commentaries, but written not
in conventionalized graphs of sound but in transient examples of shaped behavior" (1973, p. 10).
Geertz approached cultural analysis from semiotics — the study of signs (Geertz, 1973).
Ethnographers v/rite "thick descriptions" of culture as a stratified hierarcliy of meaningful
structures, while moving away from analyses of structure and behavior. These studies aim to
represent the conceptual worlds of research subjects from the "inside." Ethnographies require
intensive, sensitive, and detailed field study of cultural phenomena.
4. THE CASE FOR THE CASE METHOD
Many case-method studies appear in strategic management research, for example Kotter's
study of The General Managers (1982). As a means for acquiring empirical knowledge, the case
method suffers from well-known defects. The case method is free-wheeling, informal, and
idiosyncratic — clashing with the dominant analytic ethic. Studies like Kotter's leave no
clear trail of data and inferences which readers can use to monitor and evaluate the study.
Kotter's analysis provokes skepticism when he uses information about a mere fifteen general
managers to justify olympian theoretical conclusions and normative proclamations about
managerial work.
. Kotter and other case researchers occupy an odd epistemological position.
They try to convince readers by their realism and authenticity, they uphold the priority of
empirical data ("I ended up with files on each manager that were four to eight inches thick"),
and approve of causal analysis. Yet, unaccountably, case researchers resist standard empirical
methods — Kotter offers no hypotheses, no control group and no statistics. For these reasons,
the knowledge generated by the case method is a brittle knowledge , wandering outside any
framework, uncomfortable about the positivist framework which sets its own basic assumptions.
Analyses by Pondy & Mitroff (1979) and VJeick (1979) encouraged Smircich & Stubbart (1985)
to combine ideas from phenomenology, hermeneutics, and ethnography to delineate an interpretive
research program for strategic management. They observed that as strategic management research
strives toward the rigor of elaborate methods, it unwisely retreats farther and farther from
the strategist's lifsworld. Interpretive studies aim to restore scholarly attention to the
"inside," experiential v/orld of strategic practices, providing useful new directions for the
faltering case research enterprise.
But, interpretive ideas are not merely a justification for more case study research such
as The General Managers. Important issues differentiate interpretive case studies from
traditional policy case studies. Chiefly, these differences include:
@. Interpretive studies call for more intensive, more detailed, "thicker" studies than
Kotter delivered. They add a cultural milieu, and a historical aspect to the case. They strive
Iiarder for realism and authenticity. Where the policy case study offers us the case writer's
interpretation of the general manager's world, the ethnographic study offers us the general
manager's view of the general manager's world.
@. Language and discourse frame interpretive research issues. Ethnographies of strategy
aim to uncover the symbols, codes, and structures of signification which make strategic
behavior intelligible. These are subjects that policy case research ignores.
@. Ethnographers try to distance themselves from the values and cultural commitments of
their research subjects. At a minimum, they are alert to the issues posed by their
intervention, translations, and writing. But, policy case research lacks a self-reflective
dimension. Researchers generally (uncritically) share their subjects' values.
®. Ethnographies steer clear of normative judgments or prescriptions. They are not after
universal theories, but instead the richness and diversity of general managers' ways of life.
By contrast, case research like Kotter's study would be incomplete without prescriptive advice
about successful general managing.
8. An interpretive account offers multiple interpretations, instead of only the case
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writers' perspective, as offered in The General Managers. Interpretive research can tolerate
some ambiguities, divergence, and pluralistic ends.
Interpretive research could prove most useful to case writers and case researchers in
strategy. First, interpretive perspective offers cogent ontological, epistemological and
methodological re-modelling for case analysis research. Second, the interpretive approach
brings in the liitherto largely unexplored topic of the case researcher's motives, values,
techniques, translations, and virriting for needed scrutiny. The strategy field needs to study
case-study research,
5._SU>l£lARY. Interpretive research rejects the idea that language serves as a mere
transparent medium for mirroring reality as representation in thought. Scholars are suspicious
of the notion that objective structures and meanings can be objectively perceived.
Interpretive scholarship regards manifest or objective phenomena as smokescreens, it tries to
penetrate through these objects. Hermeneutics and cultural ethnography probe behind manifest
social objects to examine the conditions and processes that produce and sustain these symbolic
objects. Accordingly, mind and reality occupied parallel, intersecting spheres.
Interpretive analyses accept approximations, and acknowledge an uncomfortable relativism in
their accounts. Therefore, interpretive ideas about language and representation move research
one giant step away from critical theory and logical positivism.
VII. POST-iMODERMISM: STRUCTURALISM AND DECONSTRUCTION
1. STRUCTURAUSr-l,
The works of Chomsky, Levi-Strauss, Piaget, Barthes, Giddens, Lacan, Foucault, and Derrida
are often classified as structuralist or post-structuralist. These works share a common
genealogical connection to the writings of the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure (1915),
His studies of the "sign" provided the foundations for the field of semiotics. In turn,
semiotic concepts of the "sign," the "signifier,"and the "signified," afforded intellectual
linchpins for analyses reaching into sociology, anthropology, history, psychology, art, lav;,
architecture, and literary criticism. 25
In structuralism, signs are the basic unit of any language. A sign (a spoken or written
v/ord) is the "signifier" which represents a mental idea, the "signified," Saussure's great
insight was pointing out that neither signifiers (words, signs) nor the ideas signified have
any necessary, fixed, or determinate correspondence to empirical reality, "the referent, or
object." For instance the written v/ord "rock" (a signifier) represents the mental idea of
"rock." But this idea has no necessary relationship to round hard objects in the back yard.
The signfiers and the signifieds_f^rra_asystem_in themselves, separate and independent of any
material_reality_pf ^referents* Linkages to referents are only a matter of cultural
convenience. According to the structuralists, language is always metaphorical, never literal.
Figure One illustrates (represents!) how radically a structuralist idea of representation
differs from a logical positivist, critical, or interpretive ideas of representation.
Because the relationship between sign and referent is an arbitrary one, structuralists never
compare representations to "reality," a hopeless task in their viev/. They don't deny that a
material world exists. That world is just not especially relevant to understanding culture.
They don't argue for "subjective, social construction" of the world. In fact, they are
uninterested in subjective, personal projections. Instead, they just analyze signs (e.g.,
myths, stories, rituals). Structuralists follow a precise, clinical, detached method to sort
out the underlying structures of linguistic systems which govern mental operations (e.g. Levi-
Strauss, 1958). Structuralism blocks out the human individual and the variable content of
social practices. What remains are the systems of codes and rules which sustain culture:
"Meaning was neither a private experience nor a divinely ordained occurrence, it was the
product of certain shared systems of signification. The confident bourgeois belief that the
isolated individual subject was the fount and origin of all meaning took a sharp knock:
language pre-dated the individual, and was much less his or her product than he or she was the
product of it" (Eagleton, 1983, p.l07).
Although structuralism in its pure form did not last long, its prominence confirmed the
shifting preoccupation with language in social analysis,
2, POST-STRUCTURAUSM: DECONSTRUCTION A LA DERRIDA.
i. Origins. In 1966, Jacques Derrida of France's Ecole Normale Superieure made his first
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address at Johns Hopkins. Since then his fascinating and jarring ideas have stirred hot
controversy in America. Each year Eterrida conducts seminars at Yale, nov; a stronghold of
"deconstruction."
ii. Knowledge. Following Saussure, Derrida isolates the essence of language in its ability
mark differences (contrasts) and to defer to other meanings. Defining any idea alv/ays
requires contrasting signs. "Hat" is "hat" because it is not "rat" or ":^at," But "hat" is
also not "map," "that," or "revolution." Tlie signified 'liat" (or any idea) is the product of a
complex interaction of signifiers. Consequently, writing or uttering a sign carries the traces
of signs not present ("Good" carries the trace of "Evil"). Putting it another v/ay, all terras
are relational, metaphorical; calling a thing something-it-is-not in order to define i/hat-it-
Furthermore, signifiers are not unique, they always "defer" to other signifiers. In the
dictionary, "hat" defers to the substitutes, "bonnet," "beret," and "cap." In turn, one can
look up the definitions of "cap" etc. The chain never arrives at final definition, the final
signified. Deferrence is infinite. Together, the ideas of difference and deferral constitute
the idea of "differance." Infinite differance undermined Saussure's language system, where
each signifier aligned with one signfied. Whereas structuralism divided the word /idea from the
object, post-structuralism separated the word from the idea (See Figure One),
As a result of differance, language is not an obedient vehicle for thought or communicatioi
Language is the precondition of communication, not its servant. Nothing written (or spoken)
can be confined to a determinate meaning. No essence is ever immediately present in a word.
Instead, meaning is dispersed through an endless web of signifiers. There are no concepts or
terms which do not harbor the endless play of- absent signifiers.
iii. Deconstructing: a method to end all methods. Derrida invented a entirely nev; kind of
close-reading (Derrida, 1967). Targets for deconstructive readings include any text v;hich
presents oppositions (such as good/evil, truth/falsehood, us/them) in a way which confers a
privileged status on one pole of a bipolar phenomenon. V/hile structuralism was content
to merely identify the oppositions and logic of a text, Derrida set out to dismantle those
texts using the idea of differance — to deconstruct them.
Some strategic management materials present an appealing playground for deconstructive
activities. For example, some of Mintzberg's texts offer an opening for deconstruction,
Ilintzberg variously wrote on a favorite oppositional theme:
'^There is no science in managerial wor'<c« Managers work essentially as they alv/ays have —
with verbal information and intuitive (nonexplicit) processes. The management scientist has
had almost no influence on hov; the manager works" (The Mature of Managerial 1/ork, 1973, p. 5).
"Second, gestalt strategies seem to be associated with single, pov/erful leaders.
. ,
Perhaps the sophisticated integration called for by such strategies can be effected only in one
mind. The development of a gestalt strategy requires innovative thinking, rooted in synthesis
rather than analysis, based on the "intuitive" or inexplicit processes that have been
associated with the brain's right hemisphere" (Patterns in Strategy Formulation, Management
Science, 1973, p. 944).
"Analysis denies the importance of dynamic factors characteristic of policy ma'.cing; it
fails to handle the critical soft data; despite claims of objectivity, it drives the
organization toward a narrow economic morality v;hich sometimes amounts to a social immorality;
it tends to encourage bureaucratization and centralization; and it disregards another
fundamentally different mode of thinking — generally called intuition — v/hich better suits
many of the needs of policy making" ( QK 78^ 1979, p. 106).
"The literature characterizes the entrepreneur as the bold decision maker, fully in
control, who walks confidently into the future. . . This is what gave (Steinberg's) its spirit,
its drive. . . It is intuition that directs the entrepreneur, intuition based on wisdom,
detailed, ingrained
,
personalized knowledge of the v^orld.
. .
This study shows how effective
such knov/ledge can be when it is concentrated in one individual . . . The conception of a novel
strategy is best carried out in a single, informed brain" (Tracking Strategy in an
Entrepreneurial Firm, Academy of Mgmt. Journal, 1982, pp. 495-6).
Mintzberg's texts portray an opposition . Intuition dominates analysis.
Deconstruction siezes on the repressed theme of "analysis," using the text itself as a
springboard to restore that repressed theme from its marginal exile, and to subvert the
nominal theme — intuition. A rigorous deconstructive reading assiduously searches out the
systematically concealed inner contradictions, tricks, and slippery moves that sustain
Mintzberg's discussion of "intuition" over "analysis." Developing these concealed
contradictions and blindnesses, deconstruction "allows" a text to overturn itself. The tactics
of "differance", "supplementarity," "marks of erasure" and other gestures propel the literal
implications of a text toward their limits. The task is to show that the distinction betv/een
"intuition" and "analysis" rests on flawed, contradictory grounds, AiJD that the argument for
the superiority of "intuition" ultimately transforms and rebounds to establish the ascendency
of "analysis" over "intuition!!" What was banished returns to triumph over the putative message.
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The (leconstructive project v/orks entirely from within a text. No superior knowledge
originates outside or above the text. In deconstructing Mintzberg, one never disputes the
facts Mintzberg offers, never brings in additional empirical evidence or theories, never strays
from the literal text. Since deconstruction never aims for closure, a reading itself remains
open for yet another deconstruction,
iv. Summary. Deconstruction is so controversial because it works. In the hands of a
clever reader, the target texts always surrender. Derrida and others have deconstructed
important texts v/ritten by the greatest philosophers and scientists, such as Rousseau,
Ilusserl, Saussure, Freud, Plato, Hegel and others (Derrida, 1967).
Derrida wants to free philosophy from the search for origins, guaranteed truths, and
authentic presence. He maintains, '^ruth is simply the honorific title assumed by an argument
v/Iiich has got the upper hand — and kept it — in the war of competing persuasions" (Morris,
1982, p,61), Derrida acknov/ledges no secure ground for concepts or methods in_science. It is
at precisely this point that postmodern linguistic issues tie into tiie issues which trouble
logical positivism, Deconstruction shov;s that the rationalists (e.g., Liebniz, Frege, Russell
S \'/hitehead, Vienna, etc.) dream of a universal language for science will remain forever out of
reach. Philosophy and science are trapped v/ithin a language system which they can never
command. At the practical level of everyday research, differance (an inherent property of
language) prevents investigators from anchoring the definitions of terms, from setting
fixed meanings, from establishing tight operationalizations, from stabilizing reliable observati
from tying inferences or conclusions back to any data. Language will not cooperate.
Deconstruction says "no" to the whole concept of representation in logical positivism,
critical theory, and interpretation, not just to whether particular forms or representation are
more accurate than others:
".
. .
nothing is ever fully present in signs; it is an illusion for me to believe than I can
ever be fully present to you in what I say or write, because to use signs entails that my
mejaning is always somehow dispersed, divided, and never quite at one with itself.
. . I can
never have a pure, unblemished meaning or experience at all" (Eagleton, 1983, p. 130).
Differance also undermines another key idea in philosophy and science, the idea of first
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foundations or unimpeachable grounds for knov/ledge:
"Just as yestern philosophy has been 'phonocentric', centered on the 'living voice' and deeply
suspicious of the script, so also it has been in a broader sense 'logocentric*, committed to a
belief in some ultimate 'v;ord,' presence, essence, truth or reality v/hich v;ill act as the
foundation of all our thought, language, and experience . , . God, the Idea, the V/orld Spirit,
the Self . . . Freedom, Democracy, and so on," (Eagleton, 1983, p, 131).
Rorty (1979), drew on deconstructive themes when he argued that the v;hole idea of
knowledge as a "mirror" image representation of the world in the mind, originated in a
linguistic confusion tied to the metaphor of vision:
"I want to suggest that the concept of mind is the blur with v/hich l/estern intellectuals
became obsessed v/hen they finally gave up on the blur which was the theologian's concept of
God. The ineffability of the mental serves the same cultural function as the ineffability of
the divine — it vaguely suggests that science does not have the last v;ord (?.orty, 1982, i
Rorty deconstructed the entire history of Uestern philosophy and concluded that there is no way
to justify beliefs by comparing ideas to objects. Instead, science is an extended
conversation. Knov/ledge amounts to justification, not accurate representation.
After casting out traditional ideas of representation, showing the impossibility of truth
the illusions of meaning, and deceit of all knov/ledge, deconstruction v/isely evades new
theories of its own, offering no positive program. It is strikingly indifferent to its ov/n
political, social, or cultural implications. All that a deconstructionist can do is
deconstruct available texts written in the "logocentric" style, by scholars who don't know
what the deconstructionist knows, Deconstruction signals a retreat from any empirical world.
Deconstructing strategic management classics is not likely to interest many scholars
in the strategy field, or make one popular among deconstructed colleagues. Scholars have
little use for clever nihilisms which totally ignore the familiar world of general managers'
practice. Even so, the power of deconstruction hoists an enormous red flag. It conveys a
message that social sciences which ignore the pervasive modalities of language are skating on
thin ice, especially insofar as they ignore the persistent gnawing of linguistic termites at
their representational foundations.
See Sturrock (1979), Eagleton (1983) or Morris (1982) for short, accessible introductions
to Derrida's ideas,
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VIII. HIE RJTUIE REPRESE'riTATION OF STRATEGIC I lAI-JAGEI En'T.
'^/ould you tell me please, which v;ay I ought to go from here" asked Alice,
"That depends a good deal on where you want to get to," said the Cat.
"I don't much care v/here ..." said Alice.
"Then it doesn't much matter which way you go." said the cat.
",
.
.so long as I get somewhere," Alice added as an explanation.
"Oh, you're sure to do that," said the Cat, "if you only walk long enough"
(Lev/is Carroll).
Recent contributions in organization theory (Astley, 1935; Pondy u Ilitroff, 1979; Pondy,
197G; Weick, 1979, Burrell S Morgan, 1979; Daudi, 1986; Calas a Smircich, 1936) and strategic
management (Snircich S Stubbart, 1985; Chaffee, 1985) signal a renewed debate about questions
of representation, ontology (objective versus subjective), and method (qualitative versus
quantitative). Several of these have mentioned the topic of language. But, the topic of
language in organizational analysis is not new. March S Simon wrote about its relevance to
organization theory in 1958 (pp. 161-169.) Pondy (1976) and Pondy S Mitroff (1979) brought up
the subject of language ten years ago. But their idea of language was still a "picture theory.
For example, Pondy & Mitroff wrote:
"Language is a technology for processing information and meanings just as production
techniques process material inputs and outputs" (p.25).
They recommended investigating the "functions of language
. . . organizations as . . . language
using, sense-making cultures" (p.30). Postmodernism might rearrange this to: "organizations
and cultures as sense-making languages."
In a widely cited book V/eick (1979) injected the idea of "enactment" into the
organizational analysis literature. Smircich & Stubbart (1985), Chaffee (1985) and others have
brought enactment into the strategy literature. I think it is safe to say that practically
everyone is confused about what enactment really means, purveyors and critical listeners alike.
Recently, Astley (1985) made a vociferous statement about the subjective construction of
organization theory. Astley wrote:
"No theory can simply 'describe' empirical reality in neutral linguistic terms; all
theoretical perspectives are infused by biases inhering in particular world views (497) . . .
Scientific fields are word systems created and maintained through a process of negotiation
between adherents to alternative theoretical languages" (499).
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A postmodernist night counter: "All v/orld viev/s and perspectives inhere in a particular
language , . . Scientific fields and theoretical systems and negotiations are predicated on
language systens,"
But because Astley continues to rely on picture theory concepts of language, his article
ultimately relapses into old territory: " The world of practice has its ov/n 'objective' reality
On the whole, the insurrection against the received (realist) vievi/ have made some limited
progress, v/hile stirring up much confusion. I think the chief limitation of this nev; literature
lies in its inadvertent reliance on the obsolete picture theory, which robs their arguments of
their radical sense and their potential leverage. Theorists are writing about nev; theories
v;ith an old theoretical language. Pondy & Mitroff, Burrell u Morgan, Astley, and v.'eick and
others are straining against the limits of the old linguistic space, but they cannot write the
v/ords to break free, into a new field of possibilities. Only if they shift the frame of
reference to language and representation, can the radicalness and full implications of their
new views take root and flower. In other words, they are writing about the language of
theories when they need to write about the theories of language. Then, contentious issues like
macro versus micro, enacted versus given, objective versus subjective or qualitative versus
quantitative, fade out. Scholars begin to explore the complex, subtle, and pervasive linguistic
field which gives life to them in the first place (Foucault, 1972; 1973). Theorists step back,
to assess these debates as language games. It is the linguistic field, the matrix for theories
and knowledge, that theory must try to engage,
V/ith logical positivism in extremis, and with the emergence of post-modernism, several
difficult issues arise regarding strategic management scholarship:
9 VJill additional empirical rigor lead to legitimate breakthroughs or merely rigor mortis?
il Can theories of strategy withstand the depradations of deconstruction?
§ If strategic management research acloiowledges it untrustv/orthy representational system,
on what other authority can scholars conduct research, teach students and advise practitioners
in good conscience? Is strategy mainly ideology masquerading as social science?
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Uhich (if any) of the proliferating, strange, and alienating, post-positivist
alternatives merit the field investing its resources? VJhich are fads?
Can professional schools of management tolerate the self-questioning and doubt wiiich
critical, interpretive and postmodernist views bring to bear?
Debates among representational and post-representational alternatives are bound to rage
for decades. I cannot foretell v;here that struggle might lead. Surely, I l"iave settled
nothing here. Perhaps a truncated form of logical positivism will yet survive, or revive. The
primary function of this article is to notify strategy scholars that many epistemological
commitments which they currently take for granted are already a lost cause, and that their
undisciplined discipline will probably face increasing turmoil in its future if it continues to
resist aclcnowledging thorny language/representation/legitiraation issues,
IX REFLECTIONS
Conventions in scholarly writing dictate that articles should conclude with a pro forma
statement of technical limitations and a call for additional research. Certainly, this article
carries a heavy freight of limitations, chief among which are:
6 Attempting to cover too much ground in one article.
9 Mis-representation (!), oversimplifications, false inferences about tiie perspectives
described in the paper.
® Overzealous pronouncements about the complete death of logical positivism and its
connection to a particular variety of empiricism.
Like other authors, I too recommend additional theorizing and research.
But, there is something more. Critical theory, interpretation, and postmodernism . each
stress tlie need for pervasive skepticism, penetrating doubt, and relentless self-criticism —
the need to go beyond reluctant admissions tov/ard genuine critique. In the spirit of those
themes, I feel obligated to a need to acknowledge a little bit more than wliat is required by
standard authorship practice.
9 My work here is not merely a dispassionate reading of trends, it reflects an large dose
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of my personal iconoclasn. Enbracing radical themes pleases me.
I v/orry about setting myself up as an authority on critical theory, hermeneutics, and
deconstruction. My knov/ledge of these topics is not as deep or extensive as this paper
sometimes implies.
The paper repeatedly contends that logical positivism is dead. IJho cares? Why do v/e
need logical positivism? I don't credit the possibilities that modifications to logical
positivism can save it, or that it does not matter even if it is dead. Maybe scholarsliip can
get along without epistemology (Hacking, 1980; Holton, 1984).
@ I am bothered by the uneasy feeling txhat legions of scholars v;ho are more intelligent,
more experienced, and more clever than I am, still see many merits in logical positivism. Can
those scholars really be as v/rong as this paper ultimately contends?
Q I am worried about the risks of confessing my v/orries. Is it genuine? Or is it just a
tactic, the opposite of "damning with faint praise" — "praising v/ith faint damnation?"
@ Lastly, knowing that this writing is full of contradictions, hidden assumptions,
metaphorical tricks, and slippery games; I invite readers to deconstruct it.
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